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        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 






ANDRE LE-VAR HILL, 




ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 




On Petition for Review of an Order of the 
Board of Immigration Appeals 
(Agency No. A039-751-543) 
Immigration Judge:  Honorable Andrew Arthur 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
October 2, 2013 
Before:  SMITH, CHAGARES and SHWARTZ, Circuit Judges 
 







 Andre Le-Var Hill (“Hill”) petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ 
(“BIA” or “Board) dismissal of his appeal.  For the following reasons, we will deny the 




 Hill, a citizen of Jamaica, entered the United States as a lawful permanent resident in 
1985.  In 1999, he was convicted of possession of marijuana in the fourth degree in New York, 
in violation of N.Y. Penal Law. § 221.15, and sentenced to probation.  In 2011, he was 
convicted in the Southern District of New York of being a fugitive in possession of a firearm 
and ammunition in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(2), and sentenced to 18 months’ 
imprisonment.  Subsequently, he was served with a Notice to Appear charging him with being 
removable under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) on the basis of an aggravated felony firearms 
offense as defined by 8 U.S.C.  § 1101(a)(43)(E)(ii); under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) for a 
controlled substances violation; and under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(C) for a firearms violation. 
 At a hearing before the Immigration Judge (“IJ”), Hill admitted the factual allegations 
but testified that if he were removed to Jamaica, he would be subject to persecution and torture 
by the government because of his family’s association with the Jamaican Labor Party (“JLP”), 
the opposition party to the ruling People’s National Party (“PNP”).  The IJ concluded that 
Hill’s federal firearms conviction rendered him ineligible for withholding of removal because 
it was a “particularly serious crime.”1  See 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(B)(iv).  Alternatively, he 
concluded that Hill’s application failed on the merits.  The IJ also denied Hill’s application for 
deferral of removal under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”), noting that the evidence 
did not support Hill’s claim that he would likely face torture based upon his political 
affiliation. 
                                              
1
 Hill did not file an application for asylum. 
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 On appeal to the BIA, Hill did not challenge the IJ’s removability findings and his 
determination that Hill’s federal firearms conviction barred him from withholding of removal.  
The BIA found no error in the IJ’s determinations that Hill had not demonstrated eligibility for 
withholding of removal and that he was not likely to face torture in Jamaica.  In his appeal, Hill 
asserted that his due process rights were violated when his hearing was rescheduled without 
adequate notice because he was unable to have family members present to testify as to the 
hardship consequences of his removal.  However, the BIA determined that he had not shown 
the necessary prejudice because he was ineligible for discretionary relief, did not submit any 
additional evidence on appeal that he was unable to present to the IJ, and had not indicated 
before the IJ that he was not prepared to proceed.  This petition for review followed. 
II. 
Generally, we lack jurisdiction to review a final order of removal against an alien, like 
Hill, who is removable for having been convicted of an aggravated felony.
2
  8 U.S.C. § 
1252(a)(2)(C).  We retain jurisdiction, however, to review any constitutional or legal questions 
raised in his petition for review.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D); Cruz v. Att’y Gen., 452 F.3d 
240, 246-47 (3d Cir. 2006). 
III. 
 As an initial matter, Hill has not challenged the IJ’s determination that his aggravated 
felony conviction rendered him ineligible for withholding of removal.  As a result, this issue is 
                                              
2
 The agency correctly concluded that Hill was an aggravated felon based upon his conviction 




  See Bradley v. Att’y Gen., 603 F.3d 235, 243 n.8 (3d Cir. 2010) (arguments not 
raised in opening brief are waived). 
 Hill does challenge the BIA’s denial of relief under the CAT.  We may review only 
legal questions regarding Hill’s eligibility, however; factual questions are outside the scope of 
our reviewing authority.  See Pierre v. Att’y Gen., 528 F.3d 180, 184 (3d Cir. 2008) (en banc).  
Hill appears to allege that the BIA failed to consider relevant evidence concerning whether he 
established eligibility for deferral of removal under the CAT.  We may review this claim.  See 
Green v. Att’y Gen., 694 F.3d 503, 508 (3d Cir. 2012). (addressing the merits of criminal 
alien’s claim that “the IJ and BIA committed legal error by ignoring relevant evidence in the 
record”).  But Hill has failed to specify any specific evidence that was overlooked, and we 
discern no error on our own. 
Hill also appears to challenge the weight the agency gave to his evidence when 
evaluating his eligibility for CAT relief.  See id. (recognizing that petitioner’s “real argument is 
not that relevant evidence was ignored, but rather that the IJ incorrectly weighed evidence in 
making factual determinations”).  However, as we have just indicated, we lack jurisdiction 
                                              
3
 In any event, we would lack jurisdiction over such a claim.  For one thing, Hill did not argue 
to the BIA that the IJ erred in determining that he was ineligible for withholding of removal 
because his firearms conviction was “particularly serious.”  Nor did the BIA consider the 
question on its own.  See Lin v. Att’y Gen., 543 F.3d 114, 123-24 (3d Cir. 2008) (noting that 
when the BIA sua sponte addresses an otherwise unexhausted issue, failure to raise the issue on 
administrative appeal may be excused).  The failure to properly exhaust an argument deprives 
us of authority to consider it.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1); Castro v. Att’y Gen., 671 F.3d 356, 
365 (3d Cir. 2012).  In addition, our authority to review a determination that a crime was 
“particularly serious,” see Alaka v. Att’y Gen., 456 F.3d 88, 101-02 (3d Cir. 2006), is not 
unlimited.  See Kaplun v. Att’y Gen., 602 F.3d 260, 267 (3d Cir. 2010) (noting that a criminal 
alien must present “assertion[s] of legal error” in the determination that a crime was 
“particularly serious”).  
 5 
over such a claim.
4
  See Pieschacon-Villegas v. Att’y Gen., 671 F.3d 303, 309 (3d Cir. 2011) 
(court lacks jurisdiction to review criminal alien’s disagreement with BIA’s determination that 
his evidence is insufficient to demonstrate eligibility for CAT relief).  The BIA concluded that 
the record did not support any finding that public officials in Jamaica would acquiesce in any 
torture, and Hill has not shown any legal error in that conclusion. 
 As he did before the BIA, Hill asserts that his due process rights were violated when his 
hearing was rescheduled for an earlier date without receiving adequate notice.  According to 
Hill, he was prejudiced because he was not prepared for the hearing and was unable to have 
family and friends appear to testify that his removal would result in extreme hardship.  
However, the BIA correctly determined that such testimony could not aid Hill, as he was 
ineligible for discretionary relief.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a)(3) (cancellation of removal not 
available for aliens convicted of aggravated felonies).  Accordingly, Hill’s inability to present 
this testimony did not result in any violation of due process.
5
  See Delgado-Sobalvarro v. Att’y 
Gen., 625 F.3d 782, 787 (3d Cir. 2010) (“To establish a violation of due process, the 
petitioner[] must show that substantial prejudice resulted from the alleged procedural errors.”). 
                                              
4
 In any event, such a claim is meritless.  Nothing in Hill’s testimony asserted that the 
Jamaican government would likely torture him or acquiesce to his torture. Furthermore, the 
Country Reports do not support Hill’s contention that he would be tortured. While the Country 
Reports do note that recent unlawful killings by security force members have occurred, it also 
indicates that those members were acting independently of the government and that the 
government has taken steps to control corruption. Furthermore, nothing in the Reports 
indicates that these killings occurred because the victims supported the JLP.  See 
Ambartsoumian v. Ashcroft, 388 F.3d 85, 89 (3d Cir. 2004) (country reports described as the 
“most appropriate” and “perhaps best resource” on country conditions). 
5
 In any event, Hill never told the IJ that he was not prepared to proceed, and nothing in the 
record indicates that Hill actually sought hardship relief. 
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 In his brief, Hill appears to assert that he is eligible for a waiver under former INA § 
212(c) as well as a waiver under INA § 212(h).  However, he did not exhaust these claims 
before the BIA, and we therefore lack jurisdiction to consider them.
6
  See 8 U.S.C. § 
1252(d)(1); Castro v. Att’y Gen., 671 F.3d 356, 365 (3d Cir. 2012). 
IV. 




                                              
6
 We note § 212(c) relief was abolished in 1996, and Hill’s crimes occurred long after that.  
Furthermore, Hill would be ineligible for § 212(h) relief because of his aggravated felony 
conviction.  See De Leon-Reynoso v. Ashcroft, 293 F.3d 633, 638 (3d Cir. 2002). 
